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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 930104-CA 
v. : 
TIMOTHY GENE GARCIA, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of unlawful 
distribution of or offering, agreeing, consenting or arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance, a second degree felony, under 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) (Supp. 1992) . 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the Metro 
Narcotics Strike Force, whose "buy money" was lost in defendant's 
crime, is a "victim" under Utah's restitution statute. 
A trial court's statutory interpretation is accorded no 
deference on appeal, but is reviewed for correctness. City of 
Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, 
denied, 489 U.S. 841 (1990); State v. Singh, 819 P.2d 356, 359 
(Utah App. 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, 
statutes, or rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues 
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with two counts of unlawful 
distribution of or offering, agreeing, consenting or arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1) (a) (ii) (Supp. 1992) (R. 6-7). 
Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant pled guilty to 
one count, and the other count was dismissed (R. 16-24). The 
trial court then sentenced defendant to a term of one to fifteen 
years at the Utah State Prison, fined him $1,600 plus an 85% 
surcharge, and ordered him to pay $240 in restitution to the 
Metro Narcotics Strike Force (R. 26). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A statement of facts beyond that which appears above in 
the Statement of the Case is not necessary to the resolution of 
the issues presented on appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's restitution order was proper. 
Oregon, the immediate source of Utah's restitution statute, has 
ruled that the police are a "victim" under its restitution 
statute in a case presenting the identical issue as that 
presented here. Furthermore, the rationale behind the Oregon 
ruling, that restitution is allowable in cases in which the 
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parties are not "in pari delicto," is followed in Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RESTITUTION ORDER IS 
SUPPORTED BY SIGNIFICANT AUTHORITY AND WAS 
PROPER 
Following his conviction, the trial court ordered 
defendant to pay restitution in the amount of $240 to the Metro 
Narcotics Strike Force ("Metro Narcotics"), which paid defendant 
that sum in its sting operation. Defendant claims the 
restitution order is improper because Metro Narcotics is not a 
"victim" under the restitution statute. 
A. Standard of Review 
The trial court's statutory interpretation is accorded 
no deference on appeal, but is reviewed for correctness. City of 
Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, 
denied, 489 u.s. 841 (1990); State v. Singh. 819 P.2d 356, 359 
(Utah App. 1991). 
B. The Merits 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1992) (amended 1993) 
provides in pertinent part: 
(3)(a)(i) When a person is adjudged guilty of 
criminal activity which has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other 
sentence it may impose, the court shall order 
that the defendant make restitution up to 
double the amount of pecuniary damages to the 
victim or victims of the offense of which the 
defendant has pleaded guilty . . .. 
• • • 
(4) As used in Subsection (3): 
(b) "Pecuniary damages" means all special 
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damages, but not general damages, which a 
person could recover against the defendant in 
a civil action arising out of the facts or 
events constituting the defendant's criminal 
activities and includes, but is not limited 
to, the money equivalent of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and 
losses such as earnings and medical expenses. 
(d)(i) "Victim" means any person whom the 
court determines has suffered pecuniary 
damages as a result of the defendant's 
criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any 
coparticipant in the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
The State has been unable to locate any Utah cases 
relevant to the reach of the term "victim" under the statute. 
However, in State v. Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah App. 
1992), this Court recognized that Utah's restitution statute was 
derived from Oregon's restitution statute, that the statutes were 
substantially similar, and that Oregon case law was appropriate 
authority for interpreting Utah's restitution statute. See also 
State v. Depaoli, 835 P.2d 162, 163 (Utah 1992). 
In State v. Pettit. 698 P.2d 1049 (Or. Ct. App. 1985), 
the court analyzed the precise issue raised by defendant in the 
instant case. The court concluded that a city police department 
was a "victim" entitled to restitution because it was capable of 
recovering "pecuniary damages" under the statute. Specifically, 
the court determined that the city could bring a civil action for 
rescission of an illegal contract (the contract for the purchase 
of drugs) and restitution. The court noted that while parties to 
an illegal contract are not generally entitled to rescission 
where they are equally at fault, the general exception to the 
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rule was applicable in this case where the city police were 
clearly not in "pari delicto" in acting to limit criminal 
activity. Id. at 1051. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also recognized that 
restitution is available where parties are not equally at fault. 
See Andrew v. Ideal Nat'l Ins. Co., 29 Utah 2d 343, 509 P.2d 367, 
370 (1973)/ McCormick v. Life Ins. Corp. of America, 6 Utah 2d 
170, 308 P.2d 949, 952 (1957). Based on the acknowledged 
authority of Oregon law bearing on the meaning of section 76-3-
201(3), and of Utah authority recognizing the rationale upon 
which Pettit relies, the trial court's restitution order was 
proper. 
Contrary to defendant's argument, Depaoli does not 
require a different conclusion. There, the issue was whether the 
restitution statute authorized the trial court to order the 
defendant to pay restitution to the Salt Lake City Police 
Department (SLCPD) for the expense of a "code R" examination of 
the victim sexually assaulted by the defendant. The Utah Supreme 
Court held that, "[b]ecause the cost of the code R examination 
could not be recovered by the SLCPD in a civil action against 
[the] defendant, the SLCPD has not sustained pecuniary damages as 
defined by our statute and therefore is not a victim." 835 P.2d 
at 164. Here, under the rationale of Pettit. the police would be 
able to recover from defendant in a civil action; therefore, the 
police have suffered pecuniary damages as defined by the 
restitution statute and are a "victim." 
Furthermore, although defendant presents a line of 
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authority that is contrary to Pettit, see People v. Evans, 461 
N.E.2d 634, 639 (111. App. 1984), this Court has correctly looked 
to Oregon authority for interpretation of Utah's restitution 
statute. See Twitchell. 832 P.2d at 869. "[W]hen the 
Legislature adopts a statute from another state, the presumption 
is that the Legislature is familiar with that state's judicial 
interpretations of that statute and intends to adopt them also." 
Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 904 
(Utah 1984) (citing 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 333 at 46 (1974)). 
See also Depaoli, 835 P.2d at 164-65 (looking to Oregon case law 
for interpretation of Utah statute patterned after Oregon 
statute). Therefore, Pettit should be preferred over Evans. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
affirm the trial court's restitution order. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /^L clay of July, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON U 
Assistant Attorney General 
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